Tag Archives: economy

Great Ideas, Bad Timing

The stock market is setting new highs, but fundamental economic data remains subpar. For the past several years, we have expected “next year” to finally break out to a GDP growth rate of at least 3%, representing an escape velocity to grow our way out of the credit crisis doldrums.

The zero interest rate policy sustains the slow growth scenario, but there is only so much Fed monetary policy can do. The fundamental problems are fiscal in nature, and until Washington decides business and rich people are not the cause of the problem, we’ll continue to trudge along. Policies to stimulate business and job creation would be a nice start. Can you name one pro-business policy? Requiring businesses to offer health-care helps some people with medical issues, but does it stimulate job creation? Raising the minimum wage has noble intent, but if you are running a business, you’ll sharpen your pencil again before expanding.

No one can say how long the divergence between disappointing GDP growth and a rising stock market will last. Either the economy’s pent up demand overcomes Washington’s bureaucracy and grows faster, or we’re in for a correction. Let’s ignore the possibility of change in Washington for the meantime.

The key takeaway is, plan for liquidity, lean toward equity with the balance, and hope Washington will get out of the way. Lyndon Johnson pushed his Great Society programs at the same time as he funded the Vietnam War. We had a miserable decade in the stock market. Obama is pushing social reforms at the same time we try to recover from a credit crisis. Great ideas, bad timing.

Where the Wild Things Are in the Economy

One takeaway from 2008 – 2009 is that sometimes diversification does not work as planned. Most investment asset classes declined in the credit crisis.  Cash is the conspicuous exception.

As noted in last Friday’s post, reserving for liquidity is even more important than usual (given my perception) of the elevated prospects for a market convulsion, as we make our way back to the old normal.  There’s a lot to be said for cash as an alternative to bonds.  If interest rates or inflation spikes and bond prices plunge, and if cash is available to scoop up the bargains, losses on long positions can be mitigated.

Holding cash means accepting a negative rate of return on an inflation adjusted basis.  Long-term, this is a losing strategy.  As a tactical allocation, it means not being greedy.  And if you need liquidity, it’s just common sense.

Finally, if the US dollar falls in a currency crisis, the price of imports will rise.  Perhaps the best way to hedge against the currency risk of cash, is an expanded international allocation denominated in foreign currency.  But if the “correction” is global, then the US dollar will be as good as other currencies and might prove to be a safe haven.  If this seems like a circular argument, that shows how interconnected things have become.

Bubbles

During the past 20 years, we suffered 2 vicious corrections, 2000 and 2009. Attribution is simple. In 1999, tech stocks took off to the moon on the back of internet hype. Then, the combination of low interest rates, a love of real estate born of the prior equity bubble, mortgage securitization, and other factors led to soaring house prices. By 2007, houses were generally highly leveraged and overpriced. The collateral damage of the housing and mortgage crisis spread throughout the economy in ways few had imagined.

Which brings us to today. Allow me ask the obvious, what is overpriced today and which dominoes might prove vulnerable in a correction? Our artificially low interest rates and corresponding bond valuations seem the most likely candidates for disruptive movements.

The factors driving interest rates are complex, and countless financial instruments are tied to interest rates. This is not to predict economic Armageddon, but the dominos are set. There are paths to unwind QE without disruption, but we have not been down this path before. We can hope the path to normal will not be too disruptive. I am acutely aware of what I don’t know, but I have an idea where it might come from. This is fat tail risk.

When liquidity is important, it is important to reserve for it. If managing volatility is important, you might pay a steep price to hedge. Much like the crisis of 2000 and 2009, this one, if it occurs, will likely pass within a few years. I suggest reserving for liquidity needs anticipated within 3 to 5 years, and staying the course with the balance. Manage risk, don’t try to avoid it (you can’t).